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Abstract
Emergentism and pragmatics are two research fields that study the dynamics of
linguistic communication along substantially different timescales and intelligence
levels. From the perspective of multi-agent reinforcement learning, they correspond
to stochastic games with reinforcement training and stage games with opponent
awareness. Given that their combination has been explored in linguistics, we
propose computational models that combine short-term mutual reasoning-based
pragmatics with long-term language emergentism. We explore this for agent com-
munication referential games as well as in Starcraft II, assessing the relative merits
of different kinds of mutual reasoning pragmatics models both empirically and
theoretically. Our results shed light on their importance for making inroads towards
getting more natural, accurate, robust, fine-grained, and succinct utterances.
1 Introduction
In many linguistic theories (Zipf, 1935; Lewis, 1969; Grice et al., 1975), language is viewed as a
special kind of social coordination system, in which multiple agents make interdependent decisions
of how to express and comprehend messages in order to successfully communicate real-world
information. Drawing on advances in artificial intelligence, recent work considers referential games
(Lazaridou et al., 2018) to model language learning from raw sensory input, adopting techniques from
computer vision, language processing, and multi-agent reinforcement learning. Considering agent
communication issues in multi-agent learning not only benefits the coordination of agents for tasks
with common objectives, but also manifests properties of human linguistics and suggests a potential
path towards more intelligent natural language processing techniques (Lazaridou et al., 2018).
However, in traditional linguistics, language is studied along different timescales and different levels
of deliberation, while recent work on referential games only focuses on long-term language evolution,
i.e., modeling how long-term habits develop. In this work, we propose integrated models that consider
not only long-term evolution but also short-term equilibrium finding. On the one hand, agents are
expected to conform to evolved language habits; on the other hand, they are simultaneously expected
to make rational decisions within a particular context so as to communicate more successfully. Our
models achieve both of these goals, drawing on psychological game theory (Battigalli et al., 2019),
where the payoffs reflect prior beliefs about the strategies, instead of just the final outcome.
Contributions. Our key contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We propose a new computational framework that more comprehensively models language dynamics
at different timescales. While previous work on referential games considers long-term language
evolution (also known as emergentism in linguistics), our model additionally incorporates opponent-
aware pragmatic reasoning.
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• To this end, we consider a multi-agent policy gradient reinforcement learning framework with action
costs that can account for several notions of pragmatics, including a game-theoretic pragmatics
version that allows us to assess the limits of rational deliberation.
• We conduct a series of experiments that evaluate the relative merits of different pragmatic models,
showing that they can not only improve the empirical communication accuracy both in typical
referential game settings (Lazaridou et al., 2018) and in a StarCraft II simulation (Wang et al.,
2019).
2 Background and Related work
2.1 Linguistic Background
Language system dynamics is studied at several distinct time scales (Lewis et al., 2014). Cultural
language systems mostly emerge and evolve along long time scales and can be considered a steady
prior in short term pragmatics, where language strategies of interlocutors reach temporary equilibria.
Pragmatics. Pragmatics has the shortest timescale and involves the most conscious intellectual
processes. While the term has numerous definitions in linguistics, logic, and philosophy, in general,
key aspects include reasoning about the interlocutors’ intentions and the ambiguities beyond the
expressions, according to the contexts of the conversation (Trask and Trask, 1999; Grice et al., 1975).
Computational models have often been influenced by the early work on signaling games (Lewis, 1969)
and related incomplete information games theories (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Later works (Parikh,
2001) established more comprehensive models. They mostly considered variants of disambiguation
problems, e.g., scalar implicatures (Rothschild, 2013), politeness implicatures (Clark, 2011), irony,
debating (Glazer and Rubinstein, 2006), negotiation (Cao et al., 2018), referring expression generation
(Orita et al., 2015), and rhetoric phenomena (Kao et al., 2014a,b). More recently, empirical models
have been proposed to simulate realistic human pragmatic behavior (Goodman and Frank, 2016;
Smith et al., 2013; Khani et al., 2018; Andreas and Klein, 2016; Shen et al., 2019; Achlioptas et al.,
2019; Tomlin and Pavlick, 2019), revealing practical uses of pragmatics.
Evolution and emergentism. Emergence and evolution has the longest timescale and is a more
habitual psychological process. In recent years, research on emergent communication (Lazaridou
et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2019; Zaïem and Bennequin, 2019) regained popularity using MARL settings
such as referential games. On the one hand, a communication system helps for multi-agent tasks
with complex environments and reward mechanisms, (Foerster et al., 2016a,b, 2018b), especially
when the agents can only partially observe the world state. On the other hand, the emerged languages
themselves show functions and characteristics of human languages. For example, when the world
state keeps changing and the vocabulary is a limited resource, certain phenomena of language can be
observed, such as semantic drift and compositionality (Choi et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2018; Cao et al.,
2018; Evtimova et al., 2018; Havrylov and Titov, 2017; Lowe et al., 2019).
2.2 Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
MARL allows multiple agents to learn coordination strategies in uncertain and dynamic environments,
and recently has witnessed vigorous progress in both value-based (Tan, 1993; Rashid et al., 2018) and
policy-based (Foerster et al., 2018a) methods. Learning language or communication provides effective
interaction channels for learning agents, and is an important area of modern AI research (Foerster
et al., 2016a; Singh et al., 2019; Das et al., 2019; Lazaridou et al., 2017). Inspired by the theory of
mind (TOM) (Goldman et al., 2012), opponent modeling enables agents to model the anticipated
movements of others and holds promise for addressing problems such as non-stationarity (Hernandez-
Leal et al., 2017) in a scalable way. One basic method of opponent modeling is policy reconstruction,
which predicts action probabilities of a target agent by assuming specific model structures and
learning the model parameters based on observed actions. A variant is recursive reasoning, which
introduces human-like thinking by simulating higher-order belief sequences as in I think that you
think that I think... (Albrecht and Stone, 2018).
Incorporating MARL into NLP is now a vibrant and promising avenue (Li and Bowling, 2019; Vered
et al., 2019). From the viewpoint of MARL, long timescales correspond to stochastic games with
state (historic environment / context) transitions. Short timescales corresponds to stage games, i.e., for
each state, we regard the game as a stateless game and try to solve it via methods like best responses.
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3 Pragmatic Models for Referential Games
3.1 Long-Term and Short-Term Referential Games
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Figure 1: Long-term training & baseline testing.
Inspired by the timescales of language dynamics
and their computational frameworks, we define
two kinds of referential game scenarios, namely
long-term games and short-term games.
In a long-term game setting, we follow the train-
ing framework in Lazaridou et al. (2018) to ob-
tain an emergent language system. Figure 1
illustrates the structures of the interlocutors and
the training process. For each instance, a can-
didate set of objects {ci} is provided to both
agents, but only the speaker knows the true tar-
get c. The speaker perceives this target using a
CNN and obtains a feature vector u. The listener
similarly obtains feature vectors zi for each ci.
The speaker’s LSTM then encodes u into a prob-
ability distribution over messages such that a
message m can be sampled and sent to the lis-
tener, who decodes m into z via its own LSTM and computes the similarity with each zi. A softmax
on the similarities produces a distribution for the choice t among the candidates. Both agents obtain a
reward R, which is 1 if t matches c, or 0 otherwise. Based on this reward, they update their CNN
and LSTM parameters using the REINFORCE algorithm, by maximizing R logPS0(m | c) and
R logPL0(t | m,C), respectively. In every time-step, if the reward is positive, then the outputs of the
agents’ policies are encouraged; otherwise, they are discouraged.
After this long-term training, we regard the emerged networks PS0 for the speaker and PL0 for the
listener as fixed or as slowly-changing habit priors. We subsequently rely on them as the basis for the
following test phase, during which agents may conjecture with regard to each other’s habits in order
to successfully communicate. However, they cannot rely on pre-defined rules to reach agreement,
apart for generic principles such as game theory. The baseline test method, as considered in previous
work, is to simply take the arg-max m and t from the two respective prior distributions. However, in
this paper, we propose the subsequent methods of refining this.
3.2 One-Sided Pragmatic Model
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Figure 2: Short-term test using one-sided (left) and two-sided (right) pragmatics.
SampleL. Andreas and Klein (2016) proposed a framework in which the speaker has a mental model
of the listener. Supposing c is the target, the speaker considers several possible messages but finally
picks argmaxm PS0(m|c)λPL0(c|m)1−λ. Here λ represents to what extent the speaker appreciates
the message’s consistency with its prior habit. The listener then samples t for this message m from
PL0 .
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ArgmaxL. A variant of SampleL is when, instead of sampling, the listener simply picks arg-max t.
In this case, the speaker should pick argmaxm PS0(m|c) s.t. argmaxt PL0(t|m) = c. If none of the
messages lead to a correct listener decision, the speaker sends argmaxm PS0(m|c).
3.3 Two-Sided Pragmatic Models
One-sided pragmatic models equip the speaker with a greater degree of interlocutor awareness,
enabling it to account for the listener’s thought processes and thereby improve communication
accuracy. However, the listener merely follows its pre-existing habits. When the candidates are
similar, we observe that different high-probability messages tend not to make much difference for the
listener’s decision. The speaker may have to deviate strongly from its habits to lead the listener to a
correct choice.
In the real world, both interlocutors normally have a mental model of each other and both adjust
their prior strategies accordingly. There have been a number of mathematical frameworks that
model the process of mutual conjectures. In general, starting from PL0 and PS0 , one can consider
iteratively updating the agent strategies as PSk+1(m|t) ∝ [PLk(t|m)/cost(m)]α and PLk+1(t|m) ∝
[PSk+1(m|t)P (t)]β , for all possible t ∈ {ci} and related m. In our setting, we define the cost of a
message as the reciprocal of the speaker’s prior. Additionally, P (t) are identical across candidates.
The parameters α and β reflect the uncertainty of the belief distribution.
RSA Model. When α and β are small, the new probabilities tend to be evenly distributed. If we
set them as 1, we obtain an instance of a Rational Speech Act model (RSA) (Khani et al., 2018;
Goodman and Frank, 2016): PSk+1(m|t) ∝ PLk(t|m)PSk(m|t) and PLk+1(t|m) ∝ PSk+1(m|t).
IBR Model. If, in contrast, α and β are infinitely large, the new probabilities will be a peak
distribution and we obtain an instance of an Iterated Best Response model (IBR) (Franke, 2017):
PSk+1(m|t) = δ[m−argmaxm PLk(t|m)PSk(m|t)] and PLk+1(t|m) = δ[t−argmaxt PSk+1(m|t)].
Under this framework, SampleL (λ = 0.5) is equivalent to using IBR’s S1 and L0 as action strategies.
3.3.1 Psychological Game Theoretic Pragmatics Model
We propose an additional option based on psychological game theory (Battigalli et al., 2019) and
the Games of Partial Information (GPI) model (Parikh, 2001), where each agent’s actions result
directly from game equilibria instead of iterated reasoning. The payoff of a pair of speaker and
listener strategies is determined by whether they can bring about successful communication and their
consistency with prior language habits. Compared to the other two-sided models, we expect a better
integration of long-term priors and short-term rationality under this explicit game theory framework.
Strategies and payoffs. Suppose that the candidate set is C = {c1, c2, ..., c|C|}. For each ci ∈ C,
similar to the models above, the speaker proposes a set of messages with non-trivial probabil-
ities Mi = {mi1,mi2, ...,mi|Mi|}. The set of all possible messages is M∪ =
⋃|C|
i=1Mi =
{m1,m2, ...,m|M∪|}. We define the speaker’s strategy space, in which each strategy consists
of messages to be sent for each candidate and takes the form s = (msc1 ,msc2 , ...,msc|C| ) where
msci ∈Mi. We likewise define a listener’s strategy space, in which each strategy consists of choices
of candidates for each proposed message has the form l = (clm1 , clm2 , ..., clm|M∪| ).
We then consider whether a pair of speaker strategy s and listener strategy l, in the respective
forms given above, could match if they can bring about accurate communication for each candidate:
∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., |C|}, lmsci = i. If they do not match, then Pay(s, l) = (0, 0); otherwise the payoffs
correspond to how consistent their strategies are with language habits, Pay(s, l) = (PS(s), PL(l)).
Here, the psychological game payoffs are defined as PS(s) =
∏|C|
i=1 PS0(msci |ci) and PL(l) =∑|M∪|
j=1 sim(z(mj), zclmj
) =
∏|M∪|
j=1 PL0(clmj |mj , C). Note that we assume the strategies to be
pure ones, instead of mixed distributions. For our game settings, due to the monotonicity relationships
between the strategies and their payoffs, pure strategies are sufficient to achieve optimal solutions.
Equilibrium selection. After building a game payoff table, we can find the game equilibria by setting
E = {(s1, l1), (s2, l2), ...}. If there is only one equilibrium, then the agents will select it. However,
it turns out that when the candidate objects are similar, there tend to be multiple equilibria and the
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selection is challenging. In such circumstances, we can reasonably adopt the following selection rules
that are considered common knowledge shared by the interlocutors without requiring communication.
• First check if there is a Pareto equilibrium. If so, then the agent selects it. If the algorithm stops
here, we refer to it as the GameTable model.
• If there is no Pareto equilibrium, it is possible to determine what a message represents. Note that
in such a sequential game, the speaker’s message itself contains information about the speaker’s
strategy. If a message m always corresponds to one specific candidate ct among all equilibrium
speaker strategies that include it, i.e., ∃m(∀sk ∈ E(m ∈ sk → m = mskct )), then its occurrence
must represent ct. If ct happens to be the target, then the speaker can determine to use this message
and the listener can understand it. We refer to this as GameTable-sequential.
The complexity is O(|M∪||C|) for RSA/IBR and O(|M∪||C||C||M∪|) for game theoretic models, but
there are typically no scalability concerns in pragmatics contexts.
4 Experiments
4.1 Experimental Setup
We generated MuJoCo-like objects using PyBullet (Coumans and Bai, 2016–2019), with 8 possible
colors and 5 possible shapes, at random locations on a color-changing background. The training set
consists of 3,000 such objects and the test set contains 1,000. Each training and testing instance has a
candidate set of 2 objects. For training, objects are repeatedly sampled as target or distractor from the
3,000 instances, with different position and orientation each time. The long-term training processes
1,000,000 instances. Note that agents have different viewpoints on the target, so that they do not learn
to communicate simply by comparing pixel-wise information. Instead, they are expected to learn to
encode and decode the object features from individual CNN outputs. In order to reduce the training
time, we invoke two separately pretrained AlexNet CNNs without shared parameters so the CNN
outputs for the same object will differ between the two agents. To encourage exploring more policies,
agent actions are sampled from PS0 and PL0 and these distributions are also penalized by an entropy
term if they are not sufficiently evenly distributed at an early stage. Following the setting with the
best baseline performance in Lazaridou et al. (2018), messages have a maximum length of 5 symbols
and the alphabet size is 17.
For one testing epoch, each of the 1,000 test objects serves as the target once, while distractors in
each round are sampled randomly. Similar to Lazaridou et al. (2018), the emerged language system
mainly captures color information about the objects, as well as some of the location signals. The
messages in Table 3 show the lexicon–object mapping. Virtually identical messages are produced
for candidates with the same or even just similar colors (e.g., red and magenta), which makes
them hard to disambiguate and cause most of the false predictions of the baseline. To show how
pragmatic models help in such cases, in addition to the original overall test set, we separately pay
attention to a challenging subset of around 200 instances, where the candidate’s colors are the same or
similar. We run the overall test set and the challenging set for 5 epochs each and record the accuracy
metrics in Table 1. We also care about the consistency of the pragmatic actions with the long-term
priors, assessed by computing prior probabilities of speaker messages and listener choices for the
instances with successful communication and recording them as the SP and LP values in Table 1.
All the pragmatic models involve generating message proposal sets for objects. We take the highest
probability messages that sum up to 75% and filter out the long tails. On AWS t3.xlarge (4 CPU 16G
Memory), the training takes about 1 day and an overall testing epoch on all methods takes about 1
hour.
4.2 Results
Baselines. On the overall test set, our baseline communication accuracy in Table 1 is better than
Lazaridou et al. (2018). This may stem from our use of pretrained CNNs, while the original paper
trained them during the long-term game. On the challenging disambiguation set, the baseline accuracy
drops to nearly 50%, indicating that similarly colored candidates cannot be distinguished at all.
One-sided pragmatics. One-sided pragmatics models are also regarded as benchmarks. The
SampleL results suggest that one-sided pragmatics models succeed when the speaker considers
5
Table 1: Performance of different short-term pragmatic models. SP and LP represent when an instance
results in successful communication.
Test set Overall Challenge
Model Acc±sd SP±sd LP±sd Acc±sd SP±sd LP±sd
Original 85.7 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Baseline 90.1±0.9 0.53±0.00 0.97±0.00 53.0±2.6 0.56±0.02 0.80±0.01
SampleLλ0 90.1±1.1 0.26±0.00 0.97±0.01 54.8±2.9 0.23±0.02 0.79±0.01
SampleLλ0.5 89.2±1.1 0.53±0.00 0.97±0.01 49.9±4.5 0.55±0.02 0.77±0.01
ArgmaxL 90.6±0.9 0.53±0.00 0.97±0.00 55.6±2.5 0.53±0.02 0.79±0.01
RSA_2rnd 90.9±0.9 0.53±0.00 0.95±0.00 54.0±1.9 0.54±0.01 0.66±0.05
IBR_2rnd 95.5±0.6 0.51±0.00 0.96±0.01 80.6±2.8 0.43±0.02 0.78±0.01
RSA_cnvg 90.7±0.8 0.53±0.00 0.95±0.01 55.1±2.1 0.54±0.01 0.67±0.05
IBR_cnvg 95.6±0.5 0.51±0.00 0.96±0.01 80.6±2.8 0.43±0.02 0.78±0.01
GameTable 94.9±0.6 0.51±0.00 0.95±0.00 74.6±2.0 0.46±0.01 0.72±0.03
GameTable-s 98.8±0.1 0.49±0.00 0.93±0.01 94.0±0.6 0.36±0.01 0.68±0.03
the listener’s model carefully enough. However, the improvements in communication accuracy are
not substantial. For SampleL with λ = 0, the improvement is moreover achieved at the cost of
significantly violating the speaker’s prior beliefs. We conjecture that when the candidates are similar,
their proposed messages are similar, and the listener generates similar PL0(t|m) for each message.
Thus, few proposed messages ultimately lead to a major difference in the listener’s choice. In fact,
we found that the speaker sometimes sent useful new messages, but the listener was not sufficiently
sensitive to recognize them. This suggests that two-sided models may be favorable.
RSA and IBR. We considered hierarchy depths of 2 (S0−L0−S1−L1−S2) to model a human-like
bounded rationality, as well as unlimited depth hierarchies until strategy convergence to assess its
potential limits. Table 1 manifests that 2-round RSA and IBR models already reach convergence.
This suggests that a human-like bounded rationality may be sufficient in this task scenario. RSA has
a low performance, which implies that for this game, deterministic rationality proves advantageous
over probabilistic decision making.
IBR and GameTable. IBR and GameTable are two ways to achieve an equilibrium state of mutual
conjectures. Hence, it is natural to find that they obtain similarly high accuracy on the overall test set.
For the challenge test set, IBR has a better accuracy than GameTable, but a lower speaker payoff. The
reason is that the IBR speaker and listener always set their strategies as the best response according
to each other, so the amount of irrational choices is minimized. In comparison, GameTable is not
guaranteed to have a Pareto optimal equilibrium, leading to a slightly lower accuracy. At the same
time, the communication success and the consistency with the prior beliefs are explicitly specified in
GameTable’s payoffs, so if there is a Pareto equilibrium, then both are guaranteed. In contrast, the
iterated calculations in IBR sometimes diverge from the initial priors, considering that best responses
are a form of non-linear transformation. Some potentially optimal actions are set directly to zero in
initial rounds because they are not the best choice at that time.
GameTable-sequential. Among all the frameworks, GameTable-sequential always obtains the
highest accuracy. Since agents cannot find a Pareto solution to handle all scenarios, they decide to
prefer communication success while sacrificing consistency. The game is then less about achieving a
Gricean conversation and more about just achieving a consensus, so we observe a low speaker payoff.
Thus, GameTable-sequential serves as an upper bound for pragmatic communication accuracy under
the short-term game assumptions.
4.3 Robustness for Virtual Opponent Models
In classic pragmatic frameworks, it is often assumed that interlocutors know about each other very
well. For example, the prior probabilites PS0 and PL0 are common knowledge to each other. However,
in practice, game information may be incomplete and one’s assumptions about the other interlocutor
may diverge from reality. Each person learns their own language model and reasons about others
based on their own mental model. To check how this affects pragmatics, we assume agents S and L
first respectively learn to speak and listen as before, so we obtain PS0 and PL0 , S has its own listener
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Table 2: Pragmatics communication accuracy using virtual interlocutors.
Virtual Opponent SFide LFide ArgmaxL RSA IBR GT GTs
Exact copy 100% 100% 55.6±2.5 55.1±2.1 80.6±2.8 75.5±2.0 94.0±0.6
Training 100k rnd 96.6% 97.0% 53.0±2.3 54.3±1.4 68.6±1.6 58.1±2.2 69.9±1.8
model PL′0 and L has its own speaker model PS
′
0
. We then train PS′0 and PL
′
0
by communicating with
and simulating outputs of PS0 and PL0 regarding game instances. In the end, PS′0 is similar to PS0
but not exactly the same, and similarly for the listener model. This amounts to policy reconstruction
methods from the perspective of theory of mind and opponent modeling. During testing, S and L try
to communicate using pragmatic frameworks, each using their own model as the virtual interlocutor
model. The results for this are given in Table 2. “Fide" here describes the average fidelity when a
virtual model simulates the real one, which is computed as the cosine similarity between the output
distributions of the models on the same input. We observe that although the fidelities are fairly high
after training, their minor differences substantially hamper the pragmatic performance. GameTable is
most susceptible to this, while IBR and GameTable-sequential are fairly robust.
4.4 Language Inspection
Table 3: Illustration of the main lexicons that occurred. Baseline lexicons in plain font. New lexicons
from gametable-sequential in bold font. The backgrounds are removed to make images overlap better.
okccc okdcc okncc dkccc dkhcc dodcc dcccc dnhcc dnccc nidcc niccc nkccc nkicc
Table 3 inspects the messages. For this, we traversed the test set and obtained all possible messages
and their significant corresponding target features (color and location). After the long-term training,
the emerging language system reveals potential characteristics of compositionality. Table 3 shows
that the first two digits (prefixes) of the messages principally relate to color, as well as occasionally
some location information. The third digits (suffixes) reveal key location information. Here, a plain
font represents mappings found using the baseline framework, while bold font represents the new
mappings found using the game-theoretic pragmatic framework, in which some location and color
features become distinguishable, thus aiding in the more challenging disambiguation tasks. For
example, after baseline training, almost all yellow and white targets are expressed by the speaker as
okccc. After the pragmatics computation, it expresses some white targets as okdcc and some right
hand side yellow objects as okncc. In essence, these new messages and their unique meanings are
explored and trained during the long-term training phase. However, they provide little benefit when
using the baseline or one-sided framework. Only the two-sided frameworks are able to discover the
feasibility of exploiting these potential messages.
5 Case Study: Pragmatics Between StarCraft II Allies
A recent work called NDQ (Wang et al., 2019) provides a framework for centralized training with
decentralized execution for allies in StarCraft II games. Each ally agent is modelled by a deep
recurrent Q-network (DRQN), which takes in its local observation-action history and emits action–
value pairs at each time step. Since the battle result serves as global feedback for all allies, NDQ
trains a mixer network and assign appropriate credit for each ally at the training phase. A unique
aspect of this work is that agents also learn to communicate with each other using succinct and
expressive messages. During the training process, agents gradually learn to drop messages that cannot
reduce the uncertainty in the decision-making process of other agents.
In NDQ’s setting, at time step t, agent i encodes its observation–action history τi,t as a real-valued
embedding f(τi,t). To send it to others, the agent samples a message s(f) ∼ N (f, σI) (which can
be seen as the speaker process). Other agents directly receive the message (the listener process)
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Figure 3: StarCraft II resistance against message dropping. Tested on the SC2 map 1o2r_vs_4r,
featuring 1 Overseer and 2 Roaches fight against 4 Reapers.
and feed it into their DRQNs. In our work, we attempt to use pragmatics to further improve the
message succinctness and resist message drop. We notice that f(τi,t) usually does not deviate
substantially from f(τi,t−1), so it is reasonable to assume f(τi,t) ∼ N (f(τi,t−1), I). Moreover, the
initial configurations in all episodes are similar in a SMAC map, so f(τi,0) ∼ N (µi, I), where µi
represents the average embedding value of agent i at time 0. This kind of prior distribution amounts
to the limited candidate set in short-term referential game settings, and we can adjust both sides, i.e.,
the speaker and listener strategies, based on the following principles.
(1) If there is no message drop, the listener l should reconstruct f from s, so ∀f, l(s(f)) = f ,
which is a requirement for both the speaker and the listener. (2) To better resist message drop, the
speaker should seek to reduce the amount of information of s(f) and the expected loss of element
values within it, which motivates minimizing −H(s(f)) + ∫
f
p(f)||s(f)||1df . Note for each pair
of speaker and listener strategy, linear scaling of the message values yields an infinite number of
equivalent solutions, so we constrain det(cov(s(f))) to 1. Then it is easy to find an equilibrium
solution s(f) = f − E(f) and l(s(f)) = s(f) + E(f). This means s(f) is white Gaussian noise
with the largest entropy and smallest L1-norm given det(cov(s(f))) = 1. Note that in this SC2 game,
we focus on the improvement regarding succinctness brought by pragmatics, so the consistency with
prior language habits is not important. In addition, agents do not need to bother with equilibrium
selection, since they can easily agree using this simple pre-defined equilibrium. Our overall game
setting and the agent networks are exactly the same as Wang et al. (2019).
We ran 30 million training steps and update the model by sampling 8 episodes from a replay buffer
in each step. The training was conducted on an AWS g4dn.xlarge GPU (NVIDIA T4 Tensor Core
GPU) instance and took about 20 hours. For evaluation, we drop message bits randomly and average
battle win rates under different drop rates over 100 random seeds. 16 episodes are tested for each
seed. In Figure 3, we present the performance comparison on map 1o2r_vs_4r, accompanied with
95% confidence intervals. We observe that, as the dropping rate increases, pragmatics shows its
advantage. We also obtain a form of division of labour. For example, at time step 0, the message
(0,0,0) corresponds to different pragmatic meanings for different agents.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes novel computational models incorporating opponent-aware short-term pragmatics
reasoning into long-term policy gradient emergent language systems, inspired by interdisciplinary
work in multi-agent reinforcement learning and computational linguistics. The experimental results
suggest that under our referential game settings, two-sided pragmatics models outperform one-sided
ones by finding ways to exploit the potential of the language to a greater extent. Empirically speaking,
IBR achieves significant communication accuracy with a practically viable procedure for humans,
where typically two-level reasoning is sufficient. This accords with the conclusions from cognitive
science, though IBR occasionally fails with sub-optimal actions. Our advanced game-theoretic
model provides new upper limits for communication accuracy, outperforming the classic model. We
show that the model can be applied to communication between StarCraft II allies, allowing them to
communicate more efficiently and thereby mitigating the effects of message drop. Our novel model
shows robustness under challenging settings, opening up important paths for future research.
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Broader Impact
This paper studies fundamental principles of communication, attempting to shed light on conditions
under which pragmatic reasoning can enable agents to communicate more efficiently in challenging
circumstances. Our interdisciplinary work draws novel connections between several distinct branches
of linguistics, as well as multi-agent reinforcement learning and game theory. We believe it is
important to develop models of agents endowed with communicative abilities that not only allow for
the long-term emergence of linguistic patterns but also incorporate interlocutor awareness (theory of
mind) and game theory. Recent work using language to achieve common objectives and cognitive
studies show that feedback is paramount for language learning (Zaïem and Bennequin, 2019). Thus,
these sorts of models could be important for studying how to go beyond regular data-driven training
of (neural) language models. In the long run, this sort of research has the potential to enable chatbots
or other forms of virtual personal assistants endowed with more empathy and better awareness of the
state of mind of the person they are interacting with. This might also allow them to better adapt to the
needs of underrepresented social groups and different personalities.
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